Abstract. A traceability scheme is a broadcast encryption scheme such that a data supplier T can trace malicious authorized users (traitors) who gave a decryption key to an unauthorized user (pirate). This paper rst derives lower bounds on the sizes of keys and ciphertexts. These bounds are all tight because an optimum one-time use scheme is also presented. We then propose a multiple-use scheme which approximately meets our bounds. This scheme is proven to be secure as well as much more e cient than the schemes by Chor, Fiat and Naor. Finally, practical types of asymmetric schemes with arbiter are discussed in which T cannot frame any authorized user as a traitor.
Introduction
In such applications, as pay TV, CD ROM distribution and online databases, data should only be available to authorized users. To prevent unauthorized users from accessing data, the data supplier will encrypt data and provide only the authorized users with personal keys to decrypt it. However, some unauthorized users (pirates) may obtain some decryption keys from a group of one or more authorized users (traitors). Then the pirate users can decrypt data that they are not entitled to. To prevent this, Chor, Fiat and Naor 2] proposed k-resilient traceability schemes which reveal at least one traitor when a pirate decoder is con scated if there are at most k traitors. Their schemes are, however, very ine cient and non constructive. In \open one level scheme", each user has to keep O(k 2 log n) personal decryption keys and the data supplier has to broadcast O(k 4 log n) ciphertexts, where n denotes the number of authorized users.
Their other two schemes have very large keys and very long ciphertexts, similarly. Recently, Stinson and Wei showed some explicit constructions by using combinatorial designs 11] . Although their constructions may not be as good asymptotically as those in 2], they are often better for small values of k and n. ? A part of this work has been supported by JAIST. ?? A part of this research has been supported by NSF Grant NCR-9508528.
On the other hand, this kind of traceability schemes are symmetric in the sense that the data supplier T is assumed to be honest. If T is dishonest, he can easily frame any authorized user as a traitor because T generates each user's key. P tzmann pointed out this problem and introduced asymmetric traceability schemes in which T cannot frame any user as a traitor 9]. She and Waidner 9, 10] showed an asymmetric scheme by combining the symmetric scheme of 2] with a two party protocol 1, 7] . This scheme is, however, not e cient because the symmetric scheme of 2], on which it is based, is very ine cient.
This paper rst derives lower bounds on the sizes of keys and ciphertexts for symmetric traceability schemes. These bounds are all tight because an optimum one-time use scheme is also presented. Further, we show that optimum (k; n)-traceability schemes have a strong connection with orthogonal arrays. An upper bound on the number of authorized users is obtained as a corollary.
We then propose a multiple-use traceability scheme. It has much smaller keys and much shorter ciphertexts than the schemes by Chor, Fiat and Naor 2]. Our scheme requires one personal decryption key, O(k) many encryption keys and O(k) many ciphertexts. Further, our scheme is proven to be secure in the sense that (1) it satis es secrecy requirement against outside enemies if and only if ElGamal cryptosystem is secure and (2) it can trace traitors if and only if the discrete log problem is hard. Further, the encryption key e T of a data supplier can be made public. This means that everybody can work as a data supplier by using this public key e T . The scheme of 2] does not have this property.
Our multiple-use scheme uses similar mathematics to threshold cryptosystems such as 4, 8] . A major di erence is that a single user decrypts in our scheme while k users have to cooperate to decrypt in 4, 8] . These two concepts do not seem to be equivalent because while there exists an RSA type threshold cryptosystem 5, 3], we do not know how to make an RSA type traceability scheme with the public key property mentioned above. (We constructed an RSA type non-public key version, though. The details will be given in the nal paper.)
Finally, we show two practical asymmetric traitor tracing schemes with agents or with an arbiter. The rst is a multiple-use asymmetric scheme which contains c agents who only generate keys cooperatively. In this scheme, (1) no authorized user can be framed as a traitor even if T and c ? 1 agents collude and (2) T can detect a traitor and convince a judge without the help of agents. This scheme is computationally secure. The second is a one-time use asymmetric scheme with an arbiter which is unconditionally secure.
Preliminaries

Model and notation
In the model of symmetric traceability schemes, there are n + 2 participants, a data supplier T, a set of n authorized users and a pirate user. T generates his encryption key e T and a personal decryption key e i for each authorized user i. To send actual plaintext data m only to authorized users, T rst chooses a session key s. Then 
where C is the coalition of traitors such that jCj k. The goal is to nd at least one traitor of C. From eq.(1), we see that there exists at least one u 2 C such that je p \ e u j l=k. Therefore, T nds an authorized user u such that je p \ e u j je p \ e i j for any i 6 = u. This user u is de ned as an exposed user.
As can be seen from the above, the sizes of keys and headers are very large. Their schemes are not constructive, either. More details will be surveyed in Sec.3.5.
3 Lower bounds 3.1 De nition For a traceability scheme, let E T , E i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n), S and HEAD denote the random variables induced by e T ; e i ; s and h, respectively, where e T is the data supplier's encryption key, e i is the personal decryption key of user i, s is the session key, h is the header and n denotes the number of authorized users. For simplicity, we treat the key e T as an encryption function as well, so h = e T (s). Similarly we view the personal keys e i as decryption functions, so s = e i (h).
For a random variable X, H(X) denotes the entropy of X. For X, let X 4 = fx j Pr(X = x) > 0g. jXj denotes the cardinality of X. For simplicity, we assume that jE 1 j = jE 2 j = = jE n j.
We assume that at most k authorized users are malicious.
De nition 1. We say that (E T ; E 1 ; : : : ; E n ; S; HEAD) is a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme if (1) any outside enemy has no information on s from h. That is, H(S j HEAD) = H(S): (2) Each authorized user i can uniquely decrypt s from h. That is, H(S j HEAD; E i ) = 0 for 1 8i n: (3) For every coalition of at most k authorized users (traitors), the following holds: Suppose that they (the traitors) use their personal decryption keys to construct a pirate decoder. If this decoder is capable of applying the decryption scheme, then one of the coalition members is identi ed with probability more than 1=jE i j. (4) S and (E 1 ; : : : ; E n ) are independent.
3.2 Lower bound on jE i j Theorem 2. In a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme, jE i j jSj for any i: 
Then v h is a bijection from E i to S if jE i j = jSj.
Proof. Fix a header h 2 H arbitrarily. Let v h (E i ) 4 = fv h (e i ) j e i 2 E i g. Suppose that s 0 6 2 v h (E i ) for some s 0 2 S. Then an outside enemy knows that s 0 6 2 v h (E i ) from h. This is against De nition 1(1). Therefore, v h (E i ) S. This means that jE i j jv h (E i )j jSj. It is clear that v h is a bijection if jE i j = jSj. u t
The rst part of Theorem 2 is originally due to Shannon. We presented a di erent proof in order to prove the second part which will be used in the proof of Theorem 5 and Theorem 11.
Lower bound on jH EADj
Lemma 3. In a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme, no coalition C of at most k authorized users has any information on any other authorized user's key.
Proof. Suppose that some coalition C of at most k users can guess the key e u of some user u 6 2 C with probability p > 1=jE u j. Assume that C gives this e u to a pirate as a pirate decoder. Then the data supplier will decide that user u is a traitor if he nds pirate decoder e u . This happens with probability p > 1=jE u j. since 8i : jE i j = jSj. u t Theorem 5. In a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme, log jHEADj (k + 1) log jSj (4) if the equality of eq. (2) is satis ed for any i. 
The rst inequality holds since each e T is deterministic. The rst equality holds since s0 is an injection as shown in the proof of Theorem 5. The last equality comes from Lemma 4. u t
Comparison with CFN scheme
Chor, Fiat and Naor proposed three traceability schemes 2]. In these schemes, log jE i j = 4k 2 log n log jSj; log jHEADj = 8k 4 log n log jSj; log jE i j = 2k 2 log 2 k log n log jSj; log jHEADj = 4k 3 log 4 k log n log jSj; log jE i j = 4k log(n=p)=3 log jSj; log jHEADj = 16k 2 log(n=p)=3 log jSj; respectively, where p is the cheating probability of traitors. The above values are much larger than our bounds.
4 Optimum one-time use traceability scheme 4.1 Optimum scheme
In this subsection, we show an optimum (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme which meets all our bounds. This means that our bounds are all tight. (Also, the decryption needs polynomial time which Def.1 does not require.) Let jSj = q, where q is a prime and q n.
Initialization: The data supplier T chooses a uniformly random polynomial f(x) = a 0 + a 1 x+ + a k x k over GF(q) as his encryption key e T . Next, T gives f(i) to authorized user i as a personal decryption key e i for 0 i n ? 1 De nition 7. We say that a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme is optimum if one has equalities in eq. (2), eq. (4) and eq.(6).
Theorem 8. The above is an optimum (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme.
Proof. It is clear that all the equalities of eq. (2), eq. (4) and eq.(6) are satis ed. We prove that De nition 1 is satis ed. Conditions (1), (2) and (4) are clear.
Suppose that a coalition C of users fi 1 ; : : : ; i k g generates a pirate decoder e p with probability more than 1=q such that e p does not include (i 1 ; f(i 1 )), or (i 2 ; f(i 2 )), or : : :, or (i k ; f(i k )). Since e p can decrypt s, e p must contain at least (x 0 ; f(x 0 ))
for some x 0 6 2 fi 1 ; : : : ; i k g. However, this is impossible because deg f(x) = k and C knows only the k points of f(x). u t
Connection with orthogonal array
In this subsection, we show that optimum (k; n)-one-time traceability schemes have a strong connection with orthogonal arrays.
De nition 9. An orthogonal array OA(t; l; q) is a q t l array of q symbols such that in any t columns of the array, every possible t-tuple of symbols occurs in exactly one row. The parameter t is called the strength of the OA.
First, suppose that there exists an OA(k + 1; k + n; q). Then we show that there exists a (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme such that jSj = q. Without loss of generality, assume that the set of symbols of the OA is f0; 1; : : :; q ? 1g. Let B = fb i;j g denote the q k+1 (k + n) matrix of the OA. Initialization: The data supplier T chooses a row of B at random, say the r(= e T )th row. T gives b r;k+i (= e i ) to user i as his personal key.
Distributing a session key: For a session key s, T broadcasts h = (b r;1 ; : : : ; b r;k ; b r;k+1 + s mod q) as a header. User i decrypts s as follows. From b r;1 ; : : : ; b r;k and e i = b r;k+i , he can determine r because the strength of the OA is k + 1. Therefore, he can obtain b r;k+1 and compute s.
Detection of traitors: When a pirate decoder is con scated, the pirate key e p is exposed. If e p contains (u; b r;k+u ), then T decides that user u is a traitor. Theorem 10. If there exists an OA(k+1; k+n; q), then there exists an optimum (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme such that jSj = q.
A proof will be given in the nal paper. Next, we show a weak converse. Theorem 11. If the equality of eq.(2) is satis ed for any i, then there exists an OA(k + 1; n; jSj).
Proof. Let ALL 4 = f(e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) j Pr(E 1 = e 1 ; : : : ; E n = e n ) > 0g. Consider a jALLj n matrix B which consists of all (e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) 2 ALL. We show that this matrix B is an OA(k + 1; n; jSj). Any In each case, an adversary is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which can use the data supplier T as an oracle.
Computationally secure (k; n)-traceability scheme
We will combine our optimum (k; n)-one-time traceability scheme with ElGamal cryptosystem. Let p be a prime power. Let q be a prime such that q j p ? 1, q n+1, and let g be a qth root of unity over GF(p). All the participants agree on p; q and g. Let = s: Detection of traitors: When a pirate decoder is con scated, the pirate key e p is exposed. If e p contains (u; f(u)) for some u, then T decides that user u is a traitor.
In our scheme, e T can be made public. This means that everybody can work as a data supplier by using this public key e T . We will prove, under reasonable assumptions, that our scheme is computationally secure even if e T is a public key.
Computational secrecy
Theorem 14. The computational complexity for an eavesdropper to cryptanalyze a new session key in our scheme, after having received previous session keys, the public key, the old headers and the new header is as hard (reducible in expected polynomial time) to cryptanalyze a plaintext in the ElGamal scheme when the order of g is a prime.
Proof. Let M 1 correspond with the problem of breaking our scheme and M 2 with breaking the standard ElGamal encryption scheme when the order of g is a prime. First, it is clear that the existence of a polynomial time M 2 implies the existence of a polynomial time M 1 . Secondly, suppose that there exists a polynomial time M 1 . We will show M 2 by using M 1 as a subroutine. Let the input to M 2 be (p; g; y), ( 0 ; 0 ) (= (g (2) When a pirate decoder is con scated, T can detect a traitor without any help from agents. The phase for Distributing a session key is the same as that in Sec.5.1.
Detection of traitors: When a pirate decoder is con scated, the pirate key e p is exposed. Suppose that e p contains (u; f(u)). T decides that user u is a traitor Theorem 16. T and c ?1 agents cannot frame any authorized user as a traitor with nonnegligible probability if and only if the discrete log problem is hard.
A proof and a straightforward use of 8] to achieve veri ability of the correctness of f(i), will be given in the nal paper.
6.2 Unconditionally secure asymmetric scheme with arbiter This is a one-time use asymmetric scheme in which there is an arbiter A who generates e T and fe i g. When a pirate decoder is con scated, A detects a traitor. Detection of traitors: When a pirate decoder is con scated, the pirate key e p is exposed. Suppose that e p contains (x u;1 ; x u;2 ; f 1 (x u;1 ); f 2 (x u;2 )). Then the arbiter decides that user u is a traitor.
Theorem 17. T cannot frame any user as a traitor with probability more than 1=q.
Proof. Suppose A gave e T to T and e i to authorized user i for 1 i n. Then it is clear that jfe i gj = n. On the other hand, T has no information on x i;j .
Therefore, Pr( T can frame some user) = n=q 2 1=q since q n. u t
Open problem
The bounds given in this paper only apply to the unconditionally secure case. Can these be adapted to a public key scenario?
